Boeing Struggles to Regain Footing One Year after Second Fatal Crash of MAX Jet
By Scott Reeves, China Daily | Mar. 14, 2020
Families of passengers and crew killed in the Ethiopian Airlines crash of a Boeing 737 MAX one year ago Tuesday marked the anniversary by reading the names of the victims and planting a tree at the crash site near Addis Ababa.
Boeing posted a brief message on its website: "We mourn those whose lives were lost on Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610 and offer our deepest sympathies to their families and friends."
Fallout from the crashes that killed a total of 346 passengers and crew in October 2018 and March 2019 is likely to change way the US Federal Aviation Administration certifies aircraft for commercial service, alter Boeing's corporate culture and, at least temporarily, shift leadership in the aircraft industry to European rival Airbus.
The 737 MAX, Boeing's top-selling plane, remains grounded, orders for new planes fell and the company temporarily suspended production leading to layoffs among subcontractors. In January, Boeing reported its first loss since 1997.
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg stepped down in December after rancorous Congressional hearings and David Calhoun took over. The company has been sued by those who lost family members in the crashes and by airlines for lost revenue.
Total cost from the MAX's grounding is now about US$18 billion, or twice the amount Boeing initially anticipated.
Boeing, a blue chip company whose stock performance is one of 30 used each day to calculate the Dow Jones Industrial Average, has been punished by investors. Its stock recently fetched US$222.68 a share, a decline of 44.14 percent from the 52-week high of US$398.66.
Investigators believe the 737 MAX's anti-stall device, called the Maneuvering Characteristics System (MCAS), erroneously pointed the nose of the planes down and into a fatal plunge.
Boeing was under great pressure to market a single-aisle plane to compete with Airbus. Rather than build a completely new plane, which would have taken about 10 years including testing and regulatory approval, Boeing upgraded the 737 -- a plane that first flew in 1967.
Boeing added larger, fuel-efficient engines to the MAX but moved them closer to the fuselage. This changed the handling characteristics of the plane and Boeing compensated with the MCAS, an automated system designed to keep the nose of the plane slightly raised in flight to avoid a mid-air stall.
However, critics allege that Boeing did not adequately inform pilots about the device or how to turn it off in an emergency. Some US pilots shared informal notes about MCAS but it's unclear how much the Indonesian and Ethiopian pilots knew about it.
An interim report released Monday by Ethiopian investigators said the flight crew pulled back on the controls with about 180 pounds of force, but failed to regain control of the plane. The report said neither pilot error nor airline shortcomings were major factors in the crash that killed all 157 on board.
Ethiopian investigators said the pilots should have received cockpit simulator training, including detailed instructions on steps to take if the MCAS malfunctioned.
The report differs from other governmental and industry findings that underscored how Boeing's apparently faulty assumptions about how a flight crew would react in an emergency, lax regulatory oversight and what looks like at least one incorrect command contributed to the crash.
The Ethiopian flight crew followed emergency procedures and turned off MCAS, but the report does not discuss why the crew reactivated the anti-stall device that overwhelmed their efforts to pull the plane out of its fatal dive.
The report said some cockpit warnings intended to alert the flight crew to a malfunction by the anti-stall device didn't work as intended or as described in the operation manual.
Boeing said it is reviewing the report and its recommendations.
After the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes, Boeing updated the MCAS software and completed about 1,100 test flights totaling about 2,100 hours.
Boeing hopes the MAX will be recertified for commercial service this summer, but the FAA has yet to approve the new software and there is no deadline for doing so.
Critics allege the FAA permitted Boeing to self-certify much of the MAX's flight control system during development, but others say new technology has outstripped the ability of regulators to accurately assess its efficacy and therefore it was necessary to rely on the company's engineers.
A new problem has arisen: The FAA this month rejected the placement of wiring bundles used in earlier versions of the 737 as a potential safety threat that could, in some situations, lead to the pilot losing control of the plane.
Boeing disagreed, but said it will work with the FAA to resolve the issue. The company still expects the plane to return to service by mid-year.
Analysts have consistently said the aircraft's technical problems can be fixed, but a basic unanswered question remains: Will passengers trust Boeing and board the MAX?