Airbus is learning the hard way that while to err might be human, to really mess up you need a computer.Or, perhaps, a printer.

The European manufacturer is reeling from new delays that mean production of its flagship A380 superjumbo is now two years behind schedule and staring at cumulative losses of E4.8 billion ($6.4 billion) in earnings.

Executive heads have already rolled and Airbus is looking at a cost-cutting campaign aimed at saving E5 billion by 2010, which sources say will result in massive job losses.

But how did a giant multinational, that not too long ago was crowing about beating its major competitor, come to this?

The answer lies partly with Airbus's structure and tensions between partner nations, particularly the French and Germans, and partly with the past failure of the company to face up to its problems.

For some time, it simply blamed the delays on customer demands for differing cabin configurations and the complexity of the wiring involved.

This week, however, it emerged the debacle began with engineering tools used to work out how to install electrical harnesses on the giant plane.

There is no doubt this is complex stuff.

The A380 has 530km of cables, 100,000 wires and 40,300 connectors.

Airbus says it is twice as complex as its next biggest plane, the A340-600.

The manufacturer was using a 3D digital mock-up to ensure the wiring fitted and was routed correctly throughout the aircraft.

The company's Hamburg designers were using the tools for the first time and were unable to cope with the changes made as the aircraft was developed, as well as those stemming from the various options offered to customers.

Unfortunately, the problems were not discovered until the cables were being installed in the aircraft and did not match reality.

It was, new chief executive Christian Streiff said when announcing the new delays this week, "the one big flaw, the one weak link in the chain".

"Quite simply, while the A380 is the most advanced and modern plane ever made, the wiring harness installation design package in the forward and rear fuselage could not keep pace with the rest of the plane," Streiff says.

"Also, the learning curve for wiring harness changes was too steep during the complex development phase.

"We have to update and harmonise the 3D design tools and database and it will take time to do this."

A better, unconfirmed story doing the aviation rounds this week was that the problem came not so much from the 3D modelling tool used to design the wiring, but the fact that Airbus workers in Hamburg printed out the diagrams in two dimensions, leaving them open to misinterpretation.

Regardless of who was responsible, however, the blunder means the first A380 will now not be delivered to Singapore Airlines until next October.

Qantas and Emirates will not get their first new planes until August 2008, and it will be 2010 before Airbus will have ramped up to its production target of four planes a month.

Streiff, who has been conducting an in-depth review of Airbus operations for the past three months, says the manufacturer is now putting in place "the right people, the right tools, the right training and the right oversight" to ensure the problem is resolved.

This includes consolidating everything in Hamburg under one manager reporting directly to Mario Heinen, who is now in charge of the overall A380 program, and the formation of teams of experts to finalise the electrical installations.

The production process is being revamped with new design tools, which will be used to redo the installation design for the next wave of aircraft, while those already in production are completed using existing programs with better organisation.

But Streiff admits: "There are no miracle solutions and our production problem is not going to be solved overnight."

The drain on the company's resources and revenues from the A380 delays raises questions about the ability to manage the A350-XWB program in competition with Boeing's 787 Dreamliner.

A weaker US dollar means Airbus also faces additional competitive pressures from Boeing at a time when it needs to generate cash to develop the A350-XWB and, ultimately, the successor to its popular single-aisle A320. It has developed a massive restructuring plan, Power 8, aimed at speeding development, maximising cash and reducing costs by E2.1 billion.

This could include taking work outside Europe to get the best deal from subcontractors.

At this stage, Airbus is not saying how many jobs this will cost, but airline sources expect it to be significant.

But Streiff, who came to Airbus from glassmaker Saint-Gobain in July, faces a much tougher problem settling the Franco-German tensions undermining the company.

He got his first taste of the complexity of the task in getting his ambitious restructuring plan through the politically charged board of Airbus parent EADS, controlled by German shareholder Daimler Chrysler, France's Lagardere and the French Government.

But he appears determined and acknowledged on Wednesday that Airbus was not yet an integrated company.

"Airbus doesn't yet have a simple and clear organisation," Streiff says.

"There are shadow hierarchies - leftovers from the never-finished integration.

"And the change we bring about must include the management culture.

"Until recently, it has been more of a green culture where the truth has not been brought to light."

This is an observation fully endorsed by airlines kept in the dark about the A380 problems until much too late.

Qantas chief financial officer Peter Gregg says: "We've been at pains to tell them that the earlier they can tell us what the problems are, the easier it is for us to manage.

"And there was something in the nature of the people that made it hard."

That the airlines are unhappy is an understatement.

The delays are causing pain for airlines that have not factored them into growth plans and product launches.

The big planes, which have better seat-mile costs than existing aircraft and could cut down on landing fees, are also part of the industry-wide push to cut costs.

Several airlines are now reviewing their orders and everyone is seeking additional compensation.

Emirates, the A380's biggest customer with an order of 45 planes, is among those reviewing its order.

It is likely to be hardest hit of all the airlines because the big planes were central to an aggressive growth strategy aimed at making the Dubai carrier the world's biggest international airline.

However, Emirates president Tim Clark says the review has no fixed timetable and cancelling orders will be a last resort.

"More important is the need to reassess our network and capacity growth in the light of the further A380 delays," Clark says.

"We are looking at acquiring aircraft to fill the gap.

"The situation is serious for us and we are having to move quickly to recapture our growth curve.

"Cancellation is a last resort. Much will depend on Airbus's ability to get things back on track and the speed in which it does it."

Qantas faces a similar capacity dilemma and has the additional problem that it has pinned the launch of its new cabin product on the big jet.

But it says it will push ahead with the aircraft and echoes other A380 customers in observing that, production problems aside, the superjumbo is shaping up to be a very good plane operationally.

The airlines also know they need both manufacturers to be healthy in order to benefit from the the competitive tension that leads to discounting on fleet orders.

Despite the serious problems, Airbus still has much going for it.Streiff says the company will produce a record 430 aircraft this year and is to deliver more next year.

It also has a backlog of 2100 aircraft on order, enough to fill the production lines for almost five years.

"So, we do have a sound, even enviable, basis to address and master our challenges and ensure a bright future for Airbus."